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Sovereign Ratings and National Culture 
 
1. Introduction 
Sovereign rating regrades can lead to the re-balancing of international portfolios and have a 
substantial impact on a country’s cost of financing (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005). Sovereign 
ratings also affect the ratings and yields of debt issued by corporate borrowers domiciled in 
the sovereign state (Cantor and Packard, 1996). Consequently, levels and changes in 
sovereign ratings are a matter of significant interest. 
Governments can choose either to honour debt agreements or to default. Thus, sovereign risk 
reflects not just capacity to pay, but also willingness to pay (Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz, 
1986; Clark and Zenaidi, 1999; S&P RatingsDirect 2013). Giving attention to willingness to 
pay in sovereign ratings directly articulates with traditional credit assessment, where the first 
of the 5Cs of credit analysis is character.  
We argue that national character, as reflected in culture, can affect both willingness and 
capacity to pay. Consistent with this, El Ghoul and Zheng (2016) find that borrowers in more 
masculine cultures are more likely to act opportunistically at the expense of lenders. National 
culture may also affect the ease with which negotiations to avoid a default can be successfully 
concluded (Guiso, Herrera, and Morelli, 2016). Attempts to define and measure national 
character can generally be traced back to culture. Thus, we follow researchers such as Nakata 
and Sivakumar (1996) and Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010), and treat national 
character and national culture as synonymous.  
There is increasing recognition of the role that culture plays in financial decision making and 
we give some examples in the next section. With respect to government decisions national 
culture will also affect whether decisions are palatable to the population. Politicians must 
translate the values and attitudes dominant in a country into political priorities. It is politically 
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unpalatable to pursue strategies contrary to deeply rooted cultural norms in a country. For 
example, the Greek and German government’s decisions during the Greek debt crisis were 
influenced by the nature of their cultures (Guiso et al., 2016, Jordan, 2017). 
Culture may have played a role in the Greek debt crisis, but it is not so clear how that role could 
be quantified. In this paper we undertake a quantitative analysis of the effect of culture on 
sovereign debt ratings based on culture measures developed by Hofstede (1980) and Hofstede et 
al. (2010). The measures used are: Power distance; Collectivism versus individualism; 
Femininity versus masculinity; Uncertainty avoidance; Long-term versus short-term orientation 
We examine whether national culture affects a nation’s rating grade and whether national 
culture affects the probability and timing of changes in that rating. There has been prior work 
on modelling sovereign rating grades and sovereign rating changes, for example Cantor and 
Packard (1996), Hill, Brooks and Faff (2010), Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2011), Alsakka and 
ap Gwilym (2012), and Reusens and Croux (2017). However, such work has not examined the 
role of culture, but rather has focused on the impact of economic variables and aspects of 
rating history and rating outlook. We extend this research by considering the effect of culture 
after controlling for variables that have been found to be significant in prior literature.  
As far as we can ascertain, there is only one published work, Fuchs and Gehring (2017), that 
attempts to use culture in the analysis of sovereign ratings. Their work is distinct from our 
work in that they analyse bias in ratings using measures of culture similarity (a common 
language, or a smaller linguistic distance). In contrast we model ratings rather than bias and 
use Hofstede’s cultural characteristics for the nation being rated. Fuchs and Gehring only look 
at rating grades, whereas our work models both rating grades and changes in those grades. 
There are also distinct differences in the nature of the empirical modelling. Fuchs and 
Gehring build linear regression models. In contrast, and consistent with the literature, we use 
non-linear probability models which are more appropriate to the analysis of categorical 
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dependent variables.  
Our study analyses Standard and Poor’s (S&P) sovereign ratings from February 1975 to June 
2013 covering 77 countries. We replicate this study using Moody’s data from April 1974 to 
June 2013 covering 72 countries.1 We estimate ordered probit models for rating levels using 
the technique of Generalised Estimating Equations (GEE) and we use Cox’s hazard model for 
the analysis of rating changes. The estimation techniques are both semi-parametric and thus 
provide more robust estimates. The models are expressed as a function of culture, controlling 
for the effect of economic variables, a history of prior defaults, rating history, and rating 
outlook.  
We find that culture is a significant determinant of sovereign ratings and the probability of a 
change in those ratings. The findings are robust to the use of instrumental variables and 
additional controls. The addition of cultural variables to the variables traditionally used to 
model ratings and rating changes results in better models according to the QIC statistic and 
likelihood ratio tests, respectively. Some cultural characteristics can have a substantial effect. 
For example, a shift from collectivism to individualism increases the chance of an S&P rating 
upgrade by more than 60%. This is a very unlikely shift for a nation but it is a feasible tilt for 
an international bond portfolio. 
The most consistently significant cultural characteristics were individualism and a long-term 
orientation. These were significant for both S&P and Moody’s ratings. Individualism and a 
long-term orientation make upgrades more likely and downgrades less likely. National 
cultures are extremely stable over time (Hofstede, 2001) and it may take many decades or 
even centuries for fundamental shifts in culture to occur.2 Thus, over extended periods, 
                                                 
1 The study periods were dictated by the rating data available to us and the availability of macroeconomic data 
used as controls. 
2 Cultures may shift over a long period of time but the differences and relative rankings between cultures remain 
intact (Hofstede, 2001). Beugelsdijk, Maseland and van Hoorn (2015) confirm this latter result. 
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countries may be culturally predisposed towards a higher, intermediate, or lower rating, and to 
rating changes in a particular direction, up, or down.  
The paper’s contribution is three-fold. First, we provide robust evidence that culture is a 
determinant of S&P’s and Moody’s rating levels and rating changes. Second, we employ 
semi-parametric techniques (GEE and stratified Cox’s hazard model) to model rating levels 
and rating changes, respectively. Our modelling controls for potential dependence among 
rating observations of the same country and provide more robust estimates than parametric 
techniques. Third, in the context of sovereign rating analysis, we are the first to employ 
instrumental variables and the two-stage residual inclusion procedure to address potential 
endogeneity of culture.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses links between 
national culture and financial decision making and suggests how national culture may affect 
ratings. This is followed by a discussion of the dimensions along which national culture is 
measured. Section 3 presents the method of analysis and the data. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results and Section 5 summarises the key findings of the study. 
2. Culture and sovereign ratings 
2.1. Culture and financial decision making 
Stulz and Williamson (2003) suggest that culture influences financial decision-making in 
three ways. First, culture affects values, this affects attitudes and then behaviours. Second, 
culture may change the intent of the law. Third, culture impacts on the allocations of 
resources in a country.  
National culture affects financial decision making at both macro and micro levels. Culture 
impacts on variables that affect sovereign ratings, for example, international trade 
(Kristjánsdóttir, Guðlaugsson, Guðmundsdóttir, Aðalsteinsson, 2017), foreign direct 
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investment (Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales, 2009; Lucke and Eichler, 2016), and exports (Chung, 
2007). It also affects economic growth, national savings, GNI (Hofstede et al., 2010; Maridal, 
2013), corruption and tax evasion (Husted, 1999; Tsakumis, Curatola, Porcano, 2007). 
Culture has also been used to explain cross-country differences in corporate risk taking (Li, 
Griffin, Yue, Zhao, 2013), corporate capital structure (Chui, Lloyd, Kwok, 2002), bank risk 
taking (Ashraf, Zheng, Arshad, 2016), bank capital structure (Haq, Hu, Faff, Pathan, 2018), 
and bank failures (Berger, Xinming, Morris, Roman, 2018). Culture also influences the 
adoption of bank-based vs stock market-based financial system (Kwok and Tadesse, 2006), 
investor legal rights (Licht, Goldschmidt, Schwartz, 2005), and mortgages defaults (Tajaddini 
and Gholipour, 2017). Of particular relevance to our study is the work of Dang (2018) who 
shows that national culture affects the probability of changes in corporate ratings.3 
The Greek sovereign debt crisis is one striking example where culture has been argued to play 
a major role. According to Jordan (2017), Greece’s collectivistic culture implies that it 
expects friends to help by offering “softer repayment terms” or forgiving its debts, and “to 
break the rules when needed.” While Guiso et al. (2016) suggest that culture explains 
Germany’s angry reaction towards Greece for hiding substantial fiscal deficits. Germany’s 
individualistic culture implies that Germans do not tolerate breaking the rules (Jordan). The 
above discussion suggests that national culture can affect governments’ decisions about 
sovereign debt. Also, S&P uses culture related variables in determining sovereign ratings 
(S&P RatingsDirect, 2013).  
Previous studies modelling the level of sovereign ratings have utilised economic and financial 
variables, whether there has been a prior default and to a lesser extent, political and 
                                                 
3 Dang (2018)’s work has close parallels with our paper, but Dang’s study is limited to corporate rating data and 
only investigates changes in corporate ratings, with no consideration of the determination of rating levels. In this 
study, we go beyond Dang’s study and examine the effects of culture on sovereign rating levels and sovereign 
rating changes. 
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institutional factors, see for example, Cantor and Packard (1996), Afonso (2003), 
Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2005), Afonso et al. (2011), and Reusens and Croux (2017). Studies 
of changes in sovereign ratings have primarily focused on macro-economic variables, rating 
history including momentum and rating outlook/CreditWatch variables, Alsakka and ap 
Gwilym (2012) and Hill et al. (2010). We use these traditional variables in our modelling of 
ratings and rating changes, and we add variables measuring national culture. 
2.2. Ratings and culture 
The credit rating market is dominated by two firms, Standard and Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s 
Investors Service (Moody’s). In this paper we start by examining ratings supplied by S&P 
because, according to Correa, Lee, Sapriza, and Suarez (2014, p. 98) their rating changes 
“…are more frequent, tend not to be anticipated by the market and tend to precede the 
changes of other rating agencies.”  Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2010) also find that S&P tends to 
be the most independent of the various agencies.  
Culture may affect rating grades and rating regrades through three channels. First by direct 
consideration of cultural factors in the analyst’s assessment of sovereign risk. Second by 
influencing the analyst’s assessment of a sovereign’s economic performance. Third, if culture 
affects ratings through the first two channels then it also affects rating history, and this in turn 
influences the current rating.  
Rating agencies are required to disclose the basis on which they form their ratings. To this 
end, S&P RatingsDirect (2013) explain that sovereign ratings depend upon both willingness 
and capacity to pay, and describe the main factors in their rating process as follows (pp. 3-4): 
 “Institutional and governance effectiveness and security risks, reflected in the 
institutional and governance effectiveness score. 
 Economic structure and growth prospects, reflected in the economic score. 
 External liquidity and international investment position, reflected in the external score. 
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 Fiscal performance and flexibility, as well as debt burden, reflected in the fiscal score. 
 Monetary flexibility, reflected in the monetary score.” 
In S&P’s discussion of how the score is derived there is direct reference to the sovereign’s 
debt payment culture and payment outcomes.   
S&P RatingsDirect (2013) makes frequent reference to rating criteria related to culture, such 
as: cohesive civil society, robustness of political institutions, stability of civil institutions, 
high social inclusion, transparency and accountability of institutions, unbiased enforcement of 
contracts and the rule of law, open debate on policy decisions, market oriented economies, 
level of corruption, tax compliance and so forth. Thus, the description of the rating process 
provides evidence that S&P explicitly considers variables related to culture in determining 
sovereign ratings.   
Economic performance, which is critical to sovereign ratings, is also related to culture. The 
score for S&P’s economic factor is dependent on quantitative data about the performance of 
the economy, with emphasis on GDP per capita and growth prospects. The evidence of 
Hofstede et al. (2010, p. 38, 263-265) is that GNI per capita correlates positively with the 
extent of individualism in a culture whereas the national saving rate and the growth rate are 
positively correlated with the degree of long-term orientation.4 Maridal (2013) also finds that 
culture influences economic development, national savings, GDP, GNI, and economic 
growth. Thus, cultural variables relate to the economic variables upon which S&P’s economic 
performance score depends.  
Rating agencies can observe currently available economic indicators, but in forming a rating 
they need to forecast how economic performance is likely to evolve over time. Analysts’ 
forecasts of future economic performance may be higher for those cultures which have the 
                                                 
4 Post 1995 the result of growth rates only applied to poor countries. There was a negative correlation for 
wealthy countries. 
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characteristics associated with better economic performance. Consequently, culture may have 
an effect on rating through its impact on expected measures of economic performance such as 
future GDP. 
Since changes in culture are very slow, it is unlikely to be changes in national culture that 
explain changes in ratings. However, we argue that some cultures may tend to experience 
more rating changes.5 For example, in cultures where political violence is more likely, 
analysts may be more prone to change ratings as political tensions rise and fall. In other cases, 
culture may result in a directional predisposition for rating changes. For example, a culture 
which predisposes to better economic performance, or better protection of investors, could 
make upgrades more likely and downgrades less likely.  
2.3. Dimensions of culture 
In selecting measures of culture we used the culture of the sovereign nation being rated, rather 
than the cultural distance between the rating agency and the nation being rated. A key reason 
for this is because it is the cultural aspects of the sovereign nation that S&P use in describing 
their rating process. Use of the nation’s culture also better matches the arguments about 
culture and ratings that we make above and the hypotheses we make below about the effect of 
specific dimensions of culture on ratings. Additionally, measuring cultural distance is more 
problematic than measuring culture, Shenkar (2001).  
Having chosen to measure culture, the question is how it should be measured. Since the 
objective of the analysis is quantitative modelling this dictates the use of quantitative 
measures of culture. Of the quantitative measures available, we chose to use Hofstede’s 
measures because they are the longest used measures and have been extensively validated. 
                                                 
5 This is analogous to individuals with high blood pressure being more likely to experience strokes or heart 
attacks. We make this point because the technique that we use for analysing ratings changes, Cox regression, has 
been extensively used in medical research. 
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Furthermore, Leung, Bhagat, Buchan, Erez, and Gibson (2005) argue that most of alternative 
culture dimensions established recently share similar concepts and correlate with Hofstede’s 
measures. While they have been much used, Hofstede’s measures are not without their critics, 
for example, McSweeney (2002) and Baskerville (2003).  
We form our expectations of the impact of culture on ratings by considering the 
characteristics that, according to the research literature, are typical of societies that score 
highly on a specific dimension of culture. We particularly select the characteristics of a 
culture that are directly mentioned in, or closely related to, the description of the rating 
process/criteria in S&P RatingsDirect (2013). 
2.3.1. Power distance index (PDI) 
Countries with a high power distance index are more likely to have military dictatorships, or 
one-party systems of government. There is also less transparency and accountability. Political 
violence and change by revolution is more likely (Hofstede et al., 2010, pp. 77-79). Such 
features are viewed as undesirable attributes by S&P. Thus, a high power distance score is 
expected to have a negative effect on ratings. 
2.3.2. Individualism versus collectivism (IDV) 
Cultures high on individualism are characterised by stronger legal rights (Litch et al., 2005) 
and lower tax evasion (Tsakumis et al., 2007). These are viewed as desirable attributes by 
S&P. Thus, greater individualism is expected to have a positive effect on ratings. The positive 
association between individualism and higher levels of GNI (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 38) also 
suggests higher ratings for more individualistic cultures. 
2.3.3. Masculinity versus femininity (MAS) 
The effect of masculinity and femininity on ratings is not clear. Masculine cultures have more 
focus on material achievement and economic growth (Hofstede et al., pp. 170-175), which 
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should be a positive for ratings. However, a more aggressive masculine approach may 
increase opportunistic behaviour with respect to lenders (El Ghoul and Zheng, 2016), may 
lead to acceptance of more indebtedness, and a more combative approach in negotiations to 
avoid default. This would have a negative effect on ratings. On the other hand, feminine 
cultures may tolerate higher indebtedness to finance a more welfare-oriented society. More 
indebtedness is a negative for ratings, but the positive rating benefit of a welfare oriented 
society is high social inclusion. Feminine cultures are also more likely to negotiate to avoid 
conflicts over debt service, which would also be a positive for ratings. 
2.3.4. Uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) 
High UA countries tend to have less market-oriented economies and a poor payment culture. 
They exhibit a tendency to pay their bills more slowly, De Mooij (2004, p. 154), and 
collecting a bounced check tends to take longer, Hofstede et al. (2010, pp. 216-217). Tax 
evasion is also associated with high UA (Tsakumis et al., 2007) and outside observers 
perceive more corruption in these countries (Hofstede et al., p. 223). High UA societies tend 
to embrace intolerant political ideologies and are often associated with aggressive nationalism 
(Hofstede et al., 2010, pp. 229-231). They are more likely to harbour extremist minorities 
(Hofstede et al., p. 221).  
Less market-oriented economies, poor payment culture, more tax evasion, more corruption 
and the risk of extremist political groups are viewed as undesirable attributes by S&P. Thus, a 
higher UAI score is expected to have a negative effect on ratings.   
2.3.5. Long-term versus short-term orientation (LTO) 
Countries with a high LTO value tend to see good and bad not as fixed attributes, but rather 
dependent on circumstances and they place importance on networks of relationships. Such 
countries score higher in Bribe Payers Index than countries with a low LTO value (Hofstede 
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et al., 2010, p. 246).  
The long-term orientation may have both positive and negative impacts on ratings. Long-term 
orientation correlates positively with growth and savings rates (Hofstede et al., 2010, pp. 38, 
263-265), both of which favour higher ratings, but more bribes and corruption would favour 
lower ratings.  
3. Methods, variables and data 
Our analysis began by modelling ratings for S&P. In order to determine whether our findings 
could be obtained in another setting, we replicated the S&P analysis using Moody’s ratings. 
The replication was intended to both test the generalizability of the results and to help guard 
against p-hacking.6 The current S&P study was preceded by analysis on a smaller S&P 
sample, where alternative models and estimation techniques were examined.7 Even though the 
current S&P study uses a larger sample, which is drawn from a longer timeframe, the current 
models are based on the earlier modelling and therefore might capitalise on chance. 
In addition to p-hacking other common methodological concerns are reverse causality and 
omitted variables. Reverse causality is unlikely to be a concern, as culture is very stable and 
only changes very slowly, over many decades or centuries, Hofstede (2001), Williamson 
(2000). It is extremely unlikely therefore that culture will change in response to a sovereign 
rating. With respect to omitted variables, we include in our initial models and in robustness 
testing a range of variables that prior studies have shown to be significant in modelling 
                                                 
6 The term p-hacking is used across a range of scientific research to describe both subconscious and conscious 
manipulation of data, methods and particularly the use of multiple testing to obtain a “statistically significant” 
result. The relevance of p-hacking to finance was highlighted by Campbell Harvey’s 2017 presidential address to 
the American Finance Association.  
7 For example, we tried dummy variables for culture with break-points either based on medians or means, which 
made little difference to the results. We also used estimation techniques with no control for dependence among 
observations of the same countries. This examination of alternative models and estimation techniques was not a 
search for significance (p-hacking) as culture variables were significant across all the models that were 
examined. 
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ratings and rating changes. We also control for omitted variables and sources of endogeneity 
in general by undertaking additional analysis using instrumental variables. 
3.1. Rating levels 
In analysing the level of sovereign ratings, we use ordered probit to model the probability of 
being in a particular rating grade. This has been popular as a method for modelling sovereign 
ratings following Hu, Kiesel and Perraudin (2002). The ordered probit model assumes that the 
rating process is governed by an unobserved latent variable 𝑦𝑖
∗ for each rating observation i, 
such that: 
*
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9
10 11 12
13 14
_ _
_ _ _ _ _
_  _  /_
 _
i
y PDI IDV MAS UAI LTO dummy prior default
dummy OECD member GDP per capita GDP gr
Curre
owt
nt account surplus GDP
Std de
h
Square of GDP growth Inflation
dummy freedom
     
  
  
 
     
  
  
      iv of world stock market index 
        (1) 
Where, independent variables are defined as in Panel A of Table 2, and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. 
The observable rating states, 𝑦𝑖 , are related to the latent variable by a series of limits zn (to be 
estimated) such that: 
𝑦𝑖 = [
1 if  𝑦𝑖
∗  ≤ 𝑧0                
𝑛 if  𝑧𝑛−1 < 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝑧𝑛
𝑛 + 1 if   𝑧𝑛 < 𝑦𝑖
∗     
]                                        (2) 
The ratings for a sovereign nation over time represent a set of repeated measures, thus there is 
a need to control for dependence in the sequence of ratings. We therefore estimate the ordered 
probit model using the technique of Generalised Estimating Equations (GEE). The advantage 
of GEE is not only controlling for dependence, but also as a semi-parametric technique it is 
more robust than parametric alternatives. 
We use all 21 rating notches for the modelling of rating levels. Table 1 gives the distribution 
of observations across the 21 rating notches and the numerical code for each rating notch. If 
the rating of a country changes in a year, we create an additional observation for the new 
rating. 
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TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE  
The independent variables for the ordered probit analysis are given in Panel A of Table 2. The 
table provides variable labels, variable definitions, expected signs and sources of data. All 
variables have been selected based on a review of the literature. References to the relevant 
studies that have used each variable are provided in Table 2. The first group of independent 
variables are the dimensions of culture as discussed above. In the empirical work we use both 
numeric scores for the culture variables and dummy variables. For the dummy variables 
scores greater than or equal to the mean score for a dimension of culture take a value of one 
and otherwise zero. The cultural variables have constant values over the period of the study 
consistent with the stability of cultures.  
The rest of the variables in Table 2 Panel A are the control variables, covering the country’s 
history of prior defaults and macroeconomic and financial variables used to model ratings. 
Hill et al. (2010) suggest the need to account for non-linearities by including a squared term 
for the GDP growth. Accordingly, we also include this squared variable in our analysis. Most 
of the control variables are updated annually, consistent with the frequency of data 
availability. However, the standard deviation of the world stock market, OECD membership, 
and the existence of a prior default were updated more frequently. If a rating changed during a 
year these three variables were updated for the new rating.   
Notable omissions from the control variables are international indebtedness and the 
government surplus/deficit. This is because missing data on these variables would have 
resulted in a very greatly reduced sample size. The sample for S&P’s (Moody’s) ratings 
would be reduced from 1764 (1606) observations to 422 (344). Including these two variables 
in robustness tests we find that they have little effect on the analysis. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE  
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3.2. Rating changes 
When is a rating change likely to occur? The duration of a rating grade depends upon the 
hazard of a rating change. We apply the premier hazard model, Cox’s hazard model (Cox, 
1972), which has been used both for analysing sovereign rating migrations as in Hill et al. 
(2010) and for analysing corporate rating migrations as in Dang and Partington (2014) and 
Dang (2018). Our use of the Cox’s model is additionally motivated by its convenience in 
handling censored observations, time-varying variables and multiple rating changes. Properly 
accounting for repeated events is important to the analysis of sovereign ratings as multiple 
rating changes of a country are common. In this study, the median number of rating changes 
across countries was five. 
Given the presence of multiple rating changes we need to control for heterogeneity in the 
underlying hazard of a rating change. Hosmer, Lemeshow, and May (2008) also raises the 
issue of sequencing repeated events. That is, a country should not be considered at risk of a 
later rating change, say the fifth change, before the earlier changes, say the fourth change has 
occurred. Similar to Dang and Partington (2014) and Dang (2018), we estimate Cox’s hazard 
models with stratification, so that rating changes that have the same number of prior changes 
are grouped in the same strata. The stratification technique allows the underlying hazard of a 
rating change to vary according to the number of prior changes and it also ensures that rating 
changes are not considered out of sequence.  
The hazard of a rating change for a country in stratum s can be derived from the underlying 
(baseline) hazard for the stratum and the country’s risk factors (covariates).8 The hazard can 
be estimated as follows: 
ℎ𝑠(𝑡, 𝑋𝑡) =  ℎ𝑠,0(𝑡)exp (𝜷𝑿𝒕)                                                (3) 
                                                 
8 The survival probability can be estimated from the hazard. 
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Where ℎ𝑠(𝑡, 𝑋𝑡) is the hazard of a rating change for a rating in stratum s at time t, with a given 
set of values for the covariates Xt, ℎ𝑠,0(𝑡) is the baseline hazard for stratum s at time t, 𝜷 is a 
vector of coefficients to be estimated and 𝑿𝒕 is a vector of covariates as defined in Panel B, 
Table 2.  
The stratified Cox’s hazard model can be estimated by multiplying together the individual 
likelihood functions for all the strata, and then maximizing the resulting product.9  
We measure the duration of a rating from the time a rating is assigned to a country until the 
time the rating is changed by one notch or is censored.10 The distribution of rating durations is 
given in Figure 1. We use 21 numerical codes to index the rating notches as in Table 1. The 
distribution of observations across the 21 rating notches is also given in Table 1.  
As in Dang (2018), the covariates that we use are of two types, time-varying and time-fixed. 
Rating outlook and rating age are time varying and their values are updated over the duration 
of a rating whenever an outlook changes or a migration of interest occurs in the sample. The 
values of time-fixed variables are recorded at the start of a rating and remain unchanged over 
the duration of a rating. Concerns that the values of these variables may become stale over 
time are mitigated as the duration of ratings in most cases was quite short (see Figure 1). 
Consequently, in most cases, there was limited time for substantial changes in the magnitude 
of the variables treated as time-fixed.11  
                                                 
9 For the benefit of readers unfamiliar with Cox’s hazard model we should explain that the estimation of the 
model is based on event time and risk sets. A risk set is the set of sovereign nations at risk of a rating regrade as 
at the time when one of the nations is regraded. In the Cox’s model the sovereign nations are subject to an 
underlying hazard of a rating change that can vary through time and this underlying hazard is scaled up or down 
according to the risk factors for each nation. A useful introduction to the Cox’s hazard model can be found in 
Allison (1995).  
10 Censored rating durations arise where the latest rating has not changed by the end of the study or, as 
subsequently discussed, because of competing risks.  
11 In the preliminary study we repeated our analysis taking the measurement of the time-fixed variables at the 
latest possible observation date prior to the rating change. There was only a small impact on the magnitude and 
significance of the estimated coefficients. 
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The covariates for the Cox’s hazard model are given in Panel B of Table 2. The first group of 
variables are again the dimensions of culture. The second group of variables control for the 
current rating, for rating history and for the time-varying rating outlook. All these variables 
have been previously used in either, or both, of modelling corporate and sovereign rating 
changes (see references in Table 2). The third group of control variables represent 
macroeconomic and financial conditions. Most of these variables are changes in the same 
macroeconomic variables as used in the probit analysis and have been previously used to 
analyse rating levels or changes. We include a debt crisis variable as Ferri, Lui and Stiglitz 
(1999) suggest that sovereign rating changes are pro-cyclical, although Mora (2006) disputes 
this view. Roychoudhury and Lawson (2010) find that economic freedom contributes to 
higher ratings, we take a slightly different tack and include a control for the impact of 
political freedom on rating changes.12 
Prior empirical evidence shows that upgrades and downgrades are governed by different 
models (Dang and Partington, 2014; Dang, 2018). Thus, we develop separate stratified hazard 
models for rating upgrades and rating downgrades. The estimation approach considers 
upgrades and downgrades competing risks. That is, if a country is currently rated, say BB, 
then an upgrade removes the country from the risk of a downgrade from the BB rating. Under 
the competing risks approach an upgrade is treated as censored when estimating the 
downgrade model and vice versa.  
3.3. Data 
The study utilises S&P’s sovereign ratings from February 1975 to June 2013 covering 77 
countries. We replicate the S&P study using Moody’s data from April 1974 to June 2013 
                                                 
12 The variable dummy freedom is derived from political rights and civil liberties scores provided by Freedom 
House (2013). Civil liberties captures religion, legal system, rule of law, and economic freedom.  
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covering 72 countries.13 The samples for S&P’s and Moody’s ratings include 1764 and 1606 
observations respectively. For the ordered probit analysis ratings are identified by year in 
order to match them to the annual economic data, but if the rating changes during the year the 
rating is updated, and an additional observation is added to the sample. With some exceptions, 
the economic data used in the ordered probit model is taken from the year prior to the start of 
a rating. As in Hill et al. (2010), GDP growth, square of GDP growth, inflation, current 
account surplus/GDP are constructed as the geometric average of the previous three-year 
annual rates. The standard deviation of the world stock market index (Std dev of world stock 
market index) is calculated using daily data over a six-month rolling window prior to the 
rating observation under study. Dummy OECD member and dummy prior default are updated 
at the time a country is assigned a rating. 
For the Cox’s hazard model we observe ratings at the level of individual notches and measure 
the duration of the rating in each notch observed for each country. We also observe whether 
the rating is subsequently upgraded or downgraded and the sequence number in the rating 
changes for each country. Requiring data for the control variables, including rating history 
and rating outlook, restricted the sample size for S&P to 382 rating durations from 70 
countries. There were 149 downgrades, 165 upgrades, and 68 censored cases. For Moody’s, 
the sample size was 303 rating durations from 62 countries. There were 106 downgrades, 135 
upgrades and 62 censored cases. 
The details of the data sources for the independent variables in the ordered probit analysis and 
the Cox’s hazard analysis are given in Table 2. The measurements of the culture variables 
across countries were obtained from a website maintained by Hofstede14 which provides the 
                                                 
13 The study periods were dictated by the ratings and macro-economic data available to us. Since we wanted to 
conduct the Moody’s and the S&P study over the same period we were constrained to a 2013 end date by our 
access to Moody’s data, although we had S&P rating data to 2017. 
14 See dimension-data-matrix in http://www.geerthofstede.nl   
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measurements from Hofstede et al. (2010) in spreadsheet format. Table 3 gives the 
descriptive statistics for the numeric scores on the five dimensions of culture across the 
different samples used in the study. The scores for each of the culture dimensions vary 
markedly across countries but the distributions of the culture variables show considerable 
similarity across all four samples in Table 3. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
4. Results 
4.1. Rating levels 
The results of the ordered probit models for rating levels are given in Table 4. The expected 
sign of a culture variable coefficient is given in parentheses next to the variable label and the 
significant coefficients are in bold. For each of the rating agencies two sets of results are 
given, first using numeric scores for the dimensions of culture, second using culture dummies.  
The QIC statistic, given at the foot of Table 4, provides a basis for comparing the models, 
with lower QIC statistics indicating more explanatory power. The QIC statistics show that the 
models with culture variables perform better than the models without culture variables.  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
The signs of the coefficients for the culture variables are the same across all the four models, 
but there are differences in statistical significance. The positive sign on individualism and the 
negative sign on uncertainty avoidance index are consistent with expectations, but not the 
positive sign on power distance index. We had no particular expectations for the sign on long-
term orientation and masculinity, which have positive and negative signs respectively. 
Individualism and the uncertainty avoidance index are significant across both models for S&P 
and across both models for Moody’s ratings. A long-term orientation is significant in both 
models for S&P and one model for Moody’s ratings. The power distance index and 
masculinity achieve significance in two out of the four estimated models.  
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All the control variables, except for dummy freedom and current account surplus/GDP have 
at least one significant coefficient. However, not all control variables are consistently 
significant between the models for S&P and Moody’s ratings. For the consistently significant 
control variables (dummy prior default, GDP per capita, GDP growth, square of GDP 
growth, and inflation) the signs of the coefficients are in accord with prior research.  
4.2. Rating changes 
The distribution of survival times (durations) for S&P and Moody’s rating changes are given 
in Figure 1. For S&P (Moody’s) ratings, the mean durations are 1.83 (1.92) years for 
downgrades and 2.45 (2.91) years for upgrades. It is evident from Figure 1 that a majority of 
ratings tend to be quite short lived. Most downgrades have durations of 6 months or less and 
most upgrades have durations of 1.5 years or less.  
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The results for the estimation of the stratified Cox’s hazard model are given in Table 5 (S&P) 
and Table 6 (Moody’s). Using the numeric culture scores and the culture dummies, two 
models are estimated for downgrades and two models for upgrades. The likelihood ratio chi 
squares, given at the foot of Table 5 and Table 6, show that the inclusion of culture variables 
significantly improves the explanatory power of the model. In all case the improvement is 
significant at the 0.01 level or better.  
TABLES 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE 
For the S&P results (Table 5) only three dimensions of culture are significant. Individualism 
is significant in three of the four models examined and has a consistent effect. The change 
from a collective to an individualistic culture decreases the risk of a downgrade by 55% and 
increases the chance of an upgrade by 69%.15 Long-term orientation and power distance only 
                                                 
15 The change in risk for a one-unit change in an independent variable can be calculated by subtracting one from 
hazard ratio. Thus a hazard ratio of 3 represents a twofold, or 200 percent increase in risk, while a hazard ratio of 
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achieve significance in one model, increasing the chance of an upgrade and reducing the risk 
of a downgrade respectively. 
For Moody’s downgrades (Table 6), high power distance, individualism and a long-term 
orientation significantly reduce the risk of a downgrade, by 42%, 69% and 35% respectively. 
However, only the effect of a long-term orientation is significant for both numeric score and 
dummy variable specifications of the downgrade models. The chance of an upgrade increases 
with a higher power distance but is only significant when culture is measured as a numeric 
score. 
The results for the control variables in Tables 5 and 6 confirm the results from the prior 
literature, that outlook and rating momentum (dummy lag one downgrade) are important in 
explaining sovereign rating changes, Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2009) and Hill et al. (2010). 
For both S&P and Moody’s, a negative (positive) outlook virtually eliminates the risk of an 
upgrade (downgrade) and increases the risk of a downgrade (upgrade) by over 300% (400%). 
With respect to momentum, a downgrade at lag one rating increases the chance of a further 
downgrade by over 60% for S&P and over 300% for Moody’s. A downgrade at lag one also 
reduces the risk of an upgrade by over 50% for S&P but has no significant effect for 
Moody’s.  
Many of the economic control variables are either not statistically significant or have a 
relatively small effect on the hazard of a rating change. Notable exceptions are the debt crisis 
variable (Dummy debt crisis) and OECD membership (Dummy OECD member). During debt 
crises the risk of a downgrade increases by more than 160% for S&P ratings, which is 
consistent with procyclical ratings (Ferri, Lui and Stiglitz, 1999). The debt crises variable is 
                                                 
0.2 represents an 80 percent reduction in risk. Such large effects are common in hazard modelling either because 
the risk being changed is small, or because a one-unit change in the independent variable represents a large 
change. 
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not significant for Moody’s ratings. However, the very strong momentum effect for Moody’s, 
as shown above, would intensify the incidence of downgrades during debt crises.  
4.3. Robustness 
a. Control variables 
The replication using Moody’s ratings is one source of confidence about the robustness of 
culture in explaining sovereign ratings and rating changes. We also note that when 
substituting time-varying CreditWatch (Watchlist) for time-varying outlook in the Cox’s 
model for S&P (Moody’s) ratings culture remains a significant determinant of rating changes. 
We also undertook additional analysis based on the samples including data for international 
indebtedness and the government surplus/deficit. These variables were originally excluded 
because missing data resulted in greatly reduced sample sizes (422 observations for S&P and 
344 observations for Moody’s). Estimating an ordered probit model fitting 21 rating notches 
and 16 variables (including international indebtedness and the government surplus/deficit) 
would result in very low statistical power. Therefore, we followed the approach that Hill et al. 
(2010) used to recode the 21 rating classes into eight rating grades. The four ordered probit 
models in Table 4 were then re-estimated with the addition of both international indebtedness 
and the government surplus/deficit variables. Next the analysis was repeated on exactly the 
same samples but excluding the variables for international indebtedness and the government 
surplus/deficit.  
The exclusion of these two variables had no impact on the sign of the coefficients for the 
culture variables and had very little impact on their magnitude. Except for individualism/ 
dummy_IDV, there was no change in the culture variables that were significant. Individualism/ 
dummy_IDV was significant in three of the four models that included international 
indebtedness and the government surplus/deficit, but not in the model for S&P ratings where 
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culture was measured by dummy variables. Whereas, after dropping these two variables, 
individualism/dummy_IDV had a significant positive effect on ratings in all four models.  
b. Different proxies for culture 
To test whether our findings are sensitive to culture proxies, we employ two culture traits 
hierarchy and embeddedness established by Schwartz (1994) as alternatives for Hofstede’s 
measures. We chose these two measures of culture because they have significant correlations 
with individual measures employed by Hofstede (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 41). Hierarchy is 
substituted for the power distance index (PDI) and embeddedness is substituted for 
individualism (IDV) but is expected to have the opposite sign.16 The ordered probit model is 
thus re-estimated using a sample of 1481 S&P ratings with no missing values for MAS, UAI, 
LTO, hierarchy and embeddedness.  
Untabulated results of the re-estimation are generally consistent with the results of the 
original S&P probit model in Table 4 (column 2). There was a significant negative effect for 
embeddedness, consistent with the prior significant positive effect of IDV. The culture 
variables of MAS, UAI, LTO are also significant and have the same sign as in the main results. 
However, hierarchy, which is substituted for PDI, is no longer significant.  
4.4. Endogeneity of culture 
Our modelling of rating levels may suffer from potential endogeneity. As discussed earlier, 
reverse causality is unlikely as culture is extremely stable. The main source of endogeneity, if 
any, might be omitted variables.17  
                                                 
16 Embeddedness is closely related to collectivism and hence is the opposite of individualism (IDV).  
17 The classic problem of endogeneity, correlation between the independent variables and the error term, does 
not apply in our modelling of rating changes because the Cox model has no error term. However, missing 
variables can still be a problem. This is mitigated by including variables well known to predict rating changes 
and which capture the views of rating analysts as expressed in the time-varying CreditWatch and time-varying 
outlook. We also include lagged rating downgrade which is a key determinant of sovereign rating changes (Hill 
et al., 2010; Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012) and we also include the current rating in the Cox’s hazard model. 
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We address the problem of omitted variables in several ways. First, we employ an extensive 
set of the key determinants of ratings as identified by the literature. Second, we test the 
robustness of the result to more controls (international indebtedness and the government 
surplus/deficit), albeit with a reduced sample size, as discussed earlier. Third, we employ the 
instrumental variable (IV) method. Our instrument variables are identified from previous 
studies on culture (Boubakri and Saffar, 2015; Aggarwal, Faccio, Guedhami and Kwok, 2016; 
El Ghoul and Zheng, 2016; Berger et al., 2018; Figlio, Giuliano, Özek, and Sapienza, 
forthcoming). The instruments, as discussed below, are a politeness distinction indicator 
(tv_diff), historical prevalence of pathogenic diseases (diseases), gender inequality, religion, 
and historical crop yield. Each instrument seems very unlikely to have a direct impact on 
rating levels over our study period and thus should satisfy the IV exclusion restriction. Each 
instrument has a relation with a culture dimension, as discussed below, and thus the 
instruments satisfy the IV relevance requirement.  
We employ a politeness distinction index namely tu-vos differentiation (tv_diff), which 
captures the share of a country’s population that speaks a language with various second-
person singular pronouns, as the instrument for power distance index (PDI). The tu-vos 
differentiation indicator was created by Davis and Abdurazokzoda (2016) and is named after 
the Latin tu and vos. People who speak languages with various second-person singular 
pronouns, for example, French (with informal tu and formal vous) or German (with informal 
du and formal Sie), are more conscious of status and social distances than those from other 
languages (Kashima and Kashima, 1998). This indicator reflects a strong emphasis on social 
status and hierarchy and thus, this implies a positive relation between tv_diff and PDI. 
To instrument for individualism (IDV) we use an index which captures the historical 
prevalence of nine infectious diseases in 230 different regions (diseases). Murray and Schaller 
(2010) created this index using the data before the epidemiological revolution in treating 
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pathogenic diseases. According to Fincher, Thornhill, Murray, and Schaller (2008), people 
from collectivistic societies are more cautious in contacting with strangers and are less likely 
to try exotic food. Collectivism performs as an anti-pathogen defence mechanism, and it is 
more likely associated with countries that have historically suffered from higher levels of 
pathogens. A positive association between the historical prevalence of diseases and 
collectivism implies a negative association with individualism (IDV). 
We employ gender inequality to instrument for masculinity (MAS). The data on gender 
inequality is for 1990 and comes from the IMF.18 Masculine countries are characterised by a 
strong division of gender roles, and gender inequality tends to occur more often in these 
countries (Hofstede et al., 2010; Berger et al., 2018). This implies a positive relation between 
gender inequality and MAS.  
To instrument for uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) we use religion, measured as the 
difference between the fractions of the Catholic and Protestant populations (catholic-
protestant). The percentage of a country’s population classed as Catholic and Protestant in 
1980 comes from La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999). Hofstede (2001) 
find that Catholic countries score higher, while Protestant countries score lower, on 
uncertainty avoidance. This implies a positive relation between Catholic minus Protestant 
(catholic-protestant) and UAI.  
Our instrument for long-term orientation (LTO) is historical crop yield (measured in tens of 
millions of kilo calories, per hectare, per year). This is based on estimates of historical crop 
yields derived by Galor and Özak (2016). To instrument for LTO we take the logarithm of the 
maximum potential caloric yield attainable given the set of crops that are suitable for 
                                                 
18 The gender inequality data is only available from 1990. A few countries have missing gender inequality data 
in 1990. For these countries we use the average of the data available over the period 1991-2012. This maintains a 
sample with the same number of countries as in the main analysis. 
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cultivation in the pre-1500 period. Galor and Özak find that people whose ancestors enjoyed 
higher crop yields exhibit long-term oriented behaviour today. This implies a positive relation 
between historical crop yield and LTO.  
Since the dependent variable for the ordered probit model is a set of ranking states, the two-
stage residual inclusion method (control function approach)19 is the appropriate way to 
address endogeneity (Wooldridge, 2015). In the first stage we regress Hofstede’s numeric 
culture values against the instrumental variables and control variable and compute the 
residuals. The second stage equation is estimated using ordered probit and contains the 
original culture and control variables plus the fitted residuals. Bootstrapping is used to 
estimate the standard errors.   
The key results of the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) procedure are reported in Table 7. 
Columns (2) to (6) include the results of the first-stage OLS regressions. Columns (7) and (8) 
give the results for the ordered probit models estimated by maximum likelihood. Colum (7) 
includes the results (coefficients and standard errors) of the second-stage ordered probit 
(endogeneity corrected) model. Column (8) includes the results (coefficients and standard 
errors) of endogeneity-uncorrected ordered probit model, and the coefficients exactly match 
those as taken from column (2) in Table 4. Significant culture variables in columns (7) and (8) 
are in bold. 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
The relation between each instrumental variable (tv_diff, diseases, gender inequality, religion, 
historical crop yield) and its respective endogenous variable (PDI, IDV, MAS, UAI, LTO) has 
a sign consistent with the discussion above, but in the case of gender inequality its effect on 
MAS is not significant (p value=12.8%), although it is significantly related to LTO. Adding 
                                                 
19 The inclusion of the fitted residuals has the effect of controlling for omitted variables, hence the alternative 
label of the control function approach.  
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the instrumental variables to a model containing only the control variables improves the R2 of 
all five first-stage regressions. The F-statistics for the test of the joint significance of the 
coefficients of the five instruments in the first-stage regressions are significant at the 1% level 
for all five regressions, confirming the explanatory power of the instruments.  
The effect of the instruments for culture on the probability of a higher rating level are given in 
column 7. The five fitted residuals added to the second-stage regression are significant 
(column 7), which indicates endogeneity in the results of the uncorrected ordered probit 
model. All culture variables are significant (column 7, in bold) and have larger absolute 
values for the coefficients relative to the original model (column 8). Except for MAS, the 
signs of the coefficients of other culture variables (column 7) are consistent with their signs in 
the uncorrected ordered probit model (column 8). Thus, after controlling for endogeneity we 
continue to find statistically significant effects of culture on rating levels. Two culture 
dimensions, IDV and LTO, give consistently significant results across the original results, 
robustness tests and the two-stage analysis.20 The significant effect of individualism is in 
harmony with the remark of Aggarwal et al. (2016, p. 467) that Hofstede’s individualism trait 
is often found to be “a particularly strong predictor of a variety of outcomes”.  
5. Conclusion 
We argue that national culture may affect both the level of a sovereign rating and the risk that 
it will change. To empirically test these propositions, we utilized Hofstede’s five dimensions 
of national culture in models of sovereign rating levels and sovereign rating changes. In 
                                                 
20 An untabulated analysis of the marginal effects of culture variables finds that the change in the probability that 
rating level being the median rating (14 or BBB+) for a one unit change in IDV and LTO (other predictors are set 
at their mean values) is respectively -.0227% and -.0219%. Without accounting for endogeneity, the change in 
that probability for a one unit change in IDV and LTO (other predictors are set at their mean values) is  -.0185% 
and -.018% respectively (untabulated). The changes in probabilities are relatively small but so is a one unit 
change in a culture measurement. 
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undertaking the modeling, we include control variables identified as relevant to sovereign 
ratings in the prior literature. The controls are important to the interpretation of the results. 
This is because national culture may affect both economic performance and previous rating 
history, both of which directly affect ratings and rating changes. Because we control for these 
variables, the results of culture that we report reflect the additional explanatory power of 
culture after controlling for current economic performance and rating history. The results 
show that culture is significant in explaining both levels of sovereign ratings and changes in 
those ratings. Including culture variables results in an improvement in the power of the 
models relative to models excluding culture.  
For sovereign rating levels there was evidence of statistical significance for all five of the 
culture dimensions, but they were not all consistently significant across the models estimated. 
Overall, individualism, uncertainty avoidance and a long-term orientation were the most 
consistently significant variables for both S&P and Moody’s rating levels. The positive 
effects of individualism and a long-term orientation and the negative effect of uncertainty 
avoidance on achieving higher rating levels were also robust to the use of instrumental 
variables for culture. For rating changes the only significant culture variables were 
individualism, a long-term orientation and the power distance index. These variables were 
significant for both S&P and Moody’s but their significance varied between models for 
upgrades and downgrades. 
Knowing the nature of a country’s culture can help explain the sovereign rating grade it 
receives. Culture is a fundamental determinant of the way governments and societies behave; 
therefore, it is not so surprising to find that culture affects sovereign ratings and in turn affects 
sovereign rating regrades. Culture only changes slowly, the economic consequence of this for 
ratings is that over long periods some countries are naturally predisposed towards lower 
ratings, while others are naturally predisposed towards higher ratings. Similarly, over long 
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periods some countries are naturally predisposed to experience rating changes in a particular 
direction. These effects are substantive, for example with respect to rating changes a shift 
from collectivism to individualism increases the chance of an S&P’s rating upgrade by 69% 
and lower the risk of an S&P’s rating downgrade by 55%. 
With respect to the debate about the cyclicality of ratings our results support procyclicality as 
argued by Ferri, Lui and Stiglitz (1999). The combination of procyclical ratings and the 
stability of culture suggests that knowledge of culture can be helpful in the management of 
international bond portfolios. For example, tilting the portfolio towards countries with an 
individualistic culture will help reduce losses from rating downgrades. This is particularly so 
during global economic downturns when, due to procyclicality, the number of downgrades 
accelerates.  
Our results also have some relevance to regulatory reforms in relation to the rating industry. 
An early strand of this reform has been to require increased disclosure in order to improve the 
transparency of the rating process. A later strand of reform has attempted to diminish the 
extent to which institutional investors rely on ratings as opposed to making their own 
judgements on credit worthiness. In respect to disclosure, our results suggest that rating 
agencies should disclose if and how they utilise culture and/or culture related variables in 
their sovereign rating process. In relation to institutional investors relying more on their own 
judgements, our results suggest that culture is a factor to consider when making judgements in 
respect to ratings, sovereign credit risk and the composition of bond portfolios.   
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Table 1 Distribution and coding of ratings 
 [[ 
S&P’s 
(Moody’s) 
Rating 
Numerical 
rating 
coding  
S&P’s sample 
for probit model 
Moody’s sample 
for probit model  
S&P’s 
sample for 
Cox model 
Moody’s 
sample for  
Cox model 
AAA (Aaa) 21 312 328  8 12 
AA+ (Aa1) 20 97 75  16 16 
AA (Aa2) 19 83 100  13 13 
AA- (Aa3) 18 64 57  18 15 
A+ (A1) 17 64 102  17 19 
A (A2) 16 124 98  24 22 
A- (A3) 15 112 87  25 23 
BBB+ (Baa1) 14 84 106  28 22 
BBB (Baa2) 13 124 50  30 15 
BBB- (Baa3) 12 135 152  32 25 
BB+ (Ba1) 11 119 118  29 25 
BB (Ba2) 10 107 63  25 18 
BB- (Ba3) 9 93 73  23 16 
B+ (B1) 8 93 67  26 23 
B (B2) 7 72 62  25 17 
B- (B3) 6 47 45  21 11 
CCC+ (Caa1) 5 14 15  8 7 
CCC (Caa2) 4 11 0  8 0 
CCC- (Caa3) 3 3 1  2 1 
CC (Ca) 2 6 5  4 2 
C (C) 1 0 2  0 1 
Total observations 1764 1606  382 303 
 
This table shows the distribution of observations over rating grades and the conversion of 
S&P’s and Moody’s alphabetic grades to numerical scores for the probit regression and for 
the Cox regression.
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Table 2 Definition of variables used in the analysis 
 
Variable  Definition References  
Panel A: Variables for the ordered probit analysis of rating levels 
 
National culture dimensions Source:  Hofstede et al. (2010) 
Power distance index  
(PDI/ -ve)  
In large PD cultures “organisations centralise power as much as possible in a few hands.” 
Inequalities are accepted without questions (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 73) 
Licht et al. (2005), Fidrmuc and Jacob (2010), Ashraf et al. 
(2016), Dang (2018), Haq et al. (2018), Berger et al. (2018) 
Individualism (IDV/ +ve)   
vs. collectivism  
A country's position on this dimension is reflected in whether people’s self-image is 
defined in terms of “I” (individualism) or “we” (collectivism).  
 
Licht et al. (2005), Tsakumis et al. (2007), Fidrmuc and 
Jacob (2010), Li et al. (2013), Boubakri and Saffar (2015), 
Ashraf et al. (2016), Tajaddini and Gholipour (2017), Haq et 
al. (2018), Dang (2018), Berger et al. (2018)  
Masculinity (MAS/ ?) vs. 
femininity 
Countries with a masculine orientation favour a performance and competitive society 
(Hofstede et al., 2010). Countries with feminine orientation “emphasize human needs, 
care and interdependence, even at the expense of accomplishment and performance” 
(Weaver, 2001, p. 9) 
Licht et al. (2005), El Ghoul and Zheng (2016), Dang 
(2018), Haq et al. (2018), Berger et al. (2018) 
Uncertainty avoidance index 
(UAI/ -ve) 
The uncertainty avoidance index reflects the degree to which a country may embrace 
uncertainty and ambiguity with ease and comfort.  
Licht et al. (2005), Kwok and Tadesse (2006), Tsakumis et 
al. (2007), Aggarwal and Goodell (2009), Fidrmuc and 
Jacob (2010), Li et al. (2013), Ashraf et al. (2016), Dang 
(2018), Haq et al. (2018), Berger et al. (2018) 
Long-term (LT/ ?) vs.     
short-term (ST) orientation 
Long-term (short-term) oriented cultures are oriented towards the future (the present). 
People in LT countries show perseverance and thrift, and they prioritise future benefit  
over current benefit (Hofstede et al., 2010, p. 239). 
Hofstede et al. (2010), Dang (2018), Haq et al. (2018), 
Figlio et al (forthcoming) 
Default history Source: S&P Global Ratings’ Credit Research (2013) 
Dummy prior default (-ve) The dummy takes the value of one if a country experienced a foreign currency-
denominated debt default prior to the rating under study, and zero otherwise 
Cantor and Packard (1996), Hu, Kiesel, Perraudin (2002), 
Afonso (2003), Mora (2006), Hill et al (2010), Dang (2018) 
 
Macroeconomic and financial variables Source: World Bank databases unless otherwise stated 
Dummy OECD member  
(+ve) 
This variable takes a value of one if a country is a member of the OECD at the start of   
the rating being analysed, and zero otherwise. 
Ferri, Lui and Stiglitz (1999), Mora (2006), Dang (2018) 
GDP growth (+ve) The geometric average of the previous three-year annual growth rate in GDP 
Cantor and Packard (1996), Ferri et al. (1999), Mora 
(2006), Hill et al. (2010), Afonso et al. (2011), Reusens and 
Croux (2017), Dang (2018) 
 
 
Hill et al. (2010) 
GDP per capita (+ve) GDP in constant (US$ 2005) prices divided by mid-year population 
Inflation (-ve) The geometric average of the previous three-year inflation as measured by the consumer 
price index. 
Current account surplus or 
deficit to GDP (+ve) 
The geometric average of the previous three-year current account surplus or deficit 
divided by GDP defined as above. 
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Std dev of world stock  
market index (-ve) 
The annualised standard deviation of the Datastream world stock market index, which is 
calculated using daily data over a six-month rolling window prior to the rating under study 
Hill et al. (2010) 
Square of GDP growth (-ve) Squared value of the GDP growth as defined above. Hill et al. (2010) 
Political rights and civil liberties Source: Freedom House (2013)  
A country is scored for each of 10 political rights indicators and 15 civil liberties indicators. The average of the score gives the freedom rating: Free (1.0 to 2.5), Partly 
Free (3.0 to 5.0), or Not Free (5.5 to 7.0). 
Dummy freedom (+ve) The dummy takes the value of one if a country is assigned a “Free” status for political 
rights and civil liberties, and zero otherwise. 
Roychoudhury and Lawson (2010) 
 
Panel B: Variables for the Cox regression analysis of rating changes (D= downgrades, U= upgrades) 
 
National culture variables: As defined above, Power distance index (PDI), Individualism (IDV) vs collectivism, Masculinity (MAS) vs. femininity, Uncertainty 
avoidance index (UAI), Long-term (LT) vs short-term (ST) orientation 
S&P’s rating data. Source: S&P’s Sovereign Ratings History (30 September 2017) 
Moody’s rating data. Source: Moody’s Investors Service (14 June 2013) 
Current rating grade (D:-ve; 
U:-ve) 
The rating grade of the rating transition being analysed. Alsakka, ap Gwilym (2009), Hill et al. (2010) 
Dummy lag one downgrade 
(D:+ve; U:-ve) 
The dummy takes the value of one if the lag one rating ends with a downgrade, and zero 
otherwise 
Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2009, 2010), Hill et al. (2010), 
Dang and Partington (2014), Dang (2018) 
Dummy prior fallen angel   
(D/U:?) 
This variable takes the value of one if a country experienced being a fallen angel  (a 
downgrade from an investment-grade rating to a speculative-grade rating) 
Vazza, Aurora and Schneck (2005), Guettler and 
Wahrenburg (2007), Dang and Partington (2014), Dang 
(2018) 
Age since first rated (D/U:?) This time-varying variable measures the duration since a country was first rated  Altman (1998), Dang and Partington (2014), Dang (2018) 
Lag one duration (D:-ve;  
U:-ve) 
The duration (in years) of the rating immediately preceding the rating being analysed Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2009), Bannier and Hirsch (2010), 
Dang and Partington (2014), Dang (2018) 
Dummy prior default 
(D:-ve; U:+ve) 
This dummy takes the value of one if a country experienced a foreign currency-
denominated debt default prior to the rating under study, and zero otherwise.           
Source: S&P Global Ratings’ Credit Research (2013) 
Cantor and Packard (1996), Hu et al. (2002), Afonso 
(2003), Mora (2006), Hill et al. (2010), Dang (2018) 
S&P’s outlook. Source: S&P’s Sovereign Ratings History (30 September 2017) 
S&P assigns a rating outlook to signal its view regarding the potential direction of a long-term credit rating over the intermediate term (six months to two years) (S&P 
RatingsDirect, 2009). Outlooks can be positive (rating may be raised), negative (rating may be lowered), stable (rating unlikely to change), or developing (rating may be 
raised or lowered) 
Moody’s outlook. Source: Moody’s Investors Service (14 June 2013) 
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Dummy negative outlook  
(D:+ve; U:-ve) 
This time-varying variable takes the value of one if a country was assigned a negative 
outlook by S&P (Moody’s), and zero otherwise.  
Vazza, Leung, Alsati and Katz (2005), Hill et al. (2010), 
Bannier and Hirsch (2010), Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012), 
Dang (2018) 
Dummy positive outlook  
(D:-ve; U:+ve) 
This time-varying variable takes the value of one if a country was assigned a positive 
outlook by S&P (Moody’s), and zero otherwise. 
Vazza et al. (2005), Hill et al. (2010), Bannier and Hirsch 
(2010), Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012), Dang (2018) 
Macroeconomic and financial conditions Source: World Bank databases unless otherwise stated 
Dummy debt crisis 
(D:+ve; U:-ve) 
This variable takes a value of one if a rating is assigned to a country during a period of 
sovereign debt and/ or banking crisis as defined in Manasse, Roubini, Schimmelpfennig 
(2003), Laeven and Valencia (2012), or De Paoli, Hoggarth, Saporta (2009), and zero 
otherwise. 
Ferri et al. (1999), Mora (2006), Dang (2018) 
Dummy OECD member 
(D/U:?) 
This variable takes a value of one if a country is a member of the OECD at the start of the 
rating under study, and zero otherwise. 
Please see references for macro-economic variables above. 
  
Change in GDP per capita 
(D:-ve; U:+ve) 
The change in real GDP per capita over the year prior to the start of the rating. 
Change in real GDP growth 
rate (D/U:?) 
The change in the real GDP growth rate over the year prior to the start of the rating.  
Change in inflation (D/U:?) The change in the inflation rate over the year prior to the start of the rating. 
Change in current account    
to GDP (D:-ve; U:+ve) 
The change in the current account to GDP ratio over the year prior to the start of the 
rating. 
Political rights and civil liberties Source: Freedom House (2013) 
A country is scored for each of 10 political rights indicators and 15 civil liberties indicators. The average of the score gives the freedom rating: Free (1.0 to 2.5), Partly 
Free (3.0 to 5.0), or Not Free (5.5 to 7.0). 
Dummy freedom (D:-ve; 
U:+ve) 
The dummy takes the value of one if a country is assigned a “Free” status, and  zero 
otherwise. 
Roychoudhury and Lawson (2010) 
This table lists the variables used in the ordered probit regression and the Cox hazard regression. The table includes the data sources, variable 
names and definitions, and references to relevant studies that have used these variables. Variable names are followed by the expected coefficient 
signs (in blue). For ordered probit analysis of rating levels (Panel A), an expected negative sign is denoted as -ve, an expected positive sign is 
denoted as +ve, no prior expectation is denoted as ?. For rating change Cox’s hazard analysis (Panel B), an expected negative (positive) sign on 
downgrades is denoted as D:-ve (D:+ve), an expected negative (positive) sign on upgrades is denoted as U:-ve (U:+ve), no prior expectation on 
downgrades and upgrades is denoted as D/U:?. Untabulated pairwise correlations and untabulated variance inflation factors for the ordered probit 
variables and Cox’s hazard model variables do not suggest any multicollinearity problem. 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics for national culture 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for culture variables, S&P’s sample for probit model (n = 1764)  
 
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Power distance index  60.69 64 20.83 11 104 
Individualism  43.65 38 22.32 12 91 
Masculinity  48.21 48 20.11 5 110 
Uncertainty avoidance index 67.03 68 22.58 8 112 
Long-term orientation 45.24 44 22.72 4 100 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for culture variables, Moody’s sample for probit model (n = 1606) 
 Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Power distance index  59.75 63 20.94 11 104 
Individualism  45.30 38 22.40 12 90 
Masculinity  48.47 50 20.37 5 110 
Uncertainty avoidance index 66.42 68 22.64 8 112 
Long-term orientation 45.55 44 21.70 4 100 
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics for culture variables, S&P’s sample for Cox’s hazard model  
(n = 382) 
 Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Power distance index  65.54 66 19.28 11 104 
Individualism  38.05 36 19.42 12 91 
Masculinity  50.29 49 19.74 5 110 
Uncertainty avoidance index 71.68 76 21.77 8 112 
Long-term orientation 45.85 45 23.56 4 100 
 
Panel D: Descriptive statistics for culture variables, Moody’s sample for Cox’s hazard model  
(n = 303) 
 Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Power distance index  64.97 66 19.06 13 104 
Individualism  39.58 37 20.05 12 90 
Masculinity  49.75 50 19.49 5 110 
Uncertainty avoidance index 70.44 75 22.55 8 112 
Long-term orientation 44.91 44 21.81 7 100 
 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for scores on the dimensions of culture across the 
samples used in the study.  
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Table 4 Probit model for S&P’s and Moody’s ratings 
 
 S&P’s sample Moody’s sample 
Variables 
Numeric culture 
score 
Culture 
dummy  
Probability  Numeric 
culture score 
Culture 
dummy  
Probability 
Culture        
Power distance index (-ve) 0.0101*  0.0894 0.0045  0.4467 
Individualism (+ve) 0.0101*  0.0699 0.0114**  0.0403 
Masculinity (?) -0.0123***  0.0089 -0.0074*  0.098 
Uncertainty avoidance index (-ve) -0.009*  0.0772 -0.0088*  0.0633 
Long-term orientation (?) 0.0099***  0.0062 0.009**  0.041 
Dummy large power distance(-ve)   0.4526** 0.0353  0.2558 0.2647 
Dummy individualism (+ve)  0.4161* 0.0652  0.4703* 0.0619 
Dummy masculine (?)  -0.1604 0.4389  -0.2016 0.3072 
Dummy strong UAI (-ve)  -0.392** 0.0453  -0.599*** 0.0043 
Dummy long-term orientation (?)  0.3903** 0.0486  0.2011 0.3139 
Controls       
Dummy prior default -1.365*** -1.292*** 0.000/0.000 -1.4437*** -1.2656*** 0.000/0.000 
Dummy OECD member 0.4104 0.3909 0.226/ 0.225 0.7098** 0.7305** 0.026/0.02 
GDP per capita  0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.000/0.000 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.000/0.000 
GDP growth 0.1929*** 0.1881*** 0.000/0.000 0.1807*** 0.1866*** 0.000/0.000 
Square of GDP growth -0.0093** -0.0078* 0.047/0.078 -0.011** -0.0123** 0.015/0.012 
Inflation -0.0018*** -0.0015** 0.003/0.015 -0.0011*** -0.0009*** 0.000/0.000 
Current account surplus/GDP 0.0202 0.0209 0.17/0.123 0.0079 0.0096 0.526/0.429 
Dummy freedom 0.2429 0.1802 0.226/0.357 0.1662 0.0476 0.422/0.802 
Std dev of world stock market index  -0.1281*** -0.1315*** 0.000/0.000 -0.0235 -0.0157 0.56/0.68 
QIC statistic 7348.4 7417.4  6674.4 6700.8  
QIC Statistic for a model only 
containing control variables 
7517.9                     7517.9 6801.1               6801.1 
 
 
This table presents the results from estimating an ordered probit model for rating levels. The 
S&P’s (Moody’s) sample includes 1764 (1606) ratings. For brevity reason, intercept estimates 
are not presented. For both samples, the probabilities of rating levels having higher ordered 
values in Table 1 (column 2) are modelled. Descriptions of the independent variables are 
given in Table 2 Panel A. The independent variables for culture are coded as numeric 
variables and dummy variables. Dummy variables take a value of one if the culture score is 
greater than or equal to the mean and zero otherwise. Significant coefficients based on robust 
standard errors (clustered at country) are shown in bold, with ***, ** and * representing 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively. For the control variables the 
probabilities are given in the form 0.001/0.002, representing the significance of the 
coefficients for models with numeric culture scores and dummy variables for culture 
respectively. 
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Table 5 Cox model for S&P’s rating changes  
 
 S&P’s sample: Numeric Culture Score S&P’s sample: Culture Dummy 
 Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade 
 Coefficient Hazard  Prob Coefficient  Hazard  Prob Coefficient  Hazard  Prob Coefficient Hazard  Prob 
Variables  ratio   ratio   ratio   ratio  
National culture dimensions             
Power distance index  -0.0119 0.988 0.202 0.00864 1.009 0.224       
Individualism  -0.0141 0.986 0.123 0.0118** 1.012 0.028       
Masculinity  -0.0055 0.995 0.289 -0.0066 0.993 0.159       
Uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) 0.0047 1.005 0.457 0.00447 1.004 0.278       
Long-term orientation 0.00586 1.006 0.380 0.2236*** 1.015 0.001       
Dummy large power distance index       -0.7726*** 0.462 0.003 0.29305 1.341 0.1968 
Dummy individualism       -0.8035* 0.448 0.058 0.52238** 1.686 0.0232 
Dummy masculine       -0.0349 0.966 0.889 -0.1626 0.85 0.3767 
Dummy strong UAI       -0.1611 0.851 0.646 0.18845 1.207 0.2263 
Dummy long-term orientation       0.64295 1.902 0.117 0.2110 1.235 0.2026 
S&P’s rating              
Current rating grade -0.0564 0.945 0.102 -0.1699*** 0.844 0.000 -0.0671** 0.935 0.041 -0.1205*** 0.886 0.000 
Dummy lag one downgrade 0.5528** 1.738 0.029 -0.8056*** 0.447 0.003 0.5177**3 1.678 0.036 -0.7025*** 0.495 0.005 
Lag one rating duration -0.0138 0.986 0.569 -0.0356 0.965 0.459 -0.0187 0.981 0.416 -0.0459 0.955 0.417 
Age since first rated (time-varying) -0.0042 0.996 0.810 0.0392 1.04 0.021 0.0001 1.000 0.996 0.0348** 1.035 0.035 
Dummy prior fallen angel  -0.1564 0.855 0.588 0.1096 1.116 0.627 -0.2358 0.79 0.379 -0.0250 0.975 0.926 
Dummy negative outlook (time-varying) 1.6401*** 5.156 0.000 -15.3260*** 0.000 0.000 1.6013*** 4.959 0.000 -15.264*** 0.000 0.000 
Dummy positive outlook (time-varying) 
 
 
-2.4201** 0.089 0.011 1.9529*** 7.049 0.001 -2.4222** 0.089 0.014 2.0098*** 7.462 0.000 
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 S&P’s sample: Numeric Culture Score S&P’s sample: Culture dummy 
 Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade 
 Coefficient Hazard  Prob Coefficient  Hazard  Prob Coefficient  Hazard  Prob Coefficient Hazard  Prob 
Variables  ratio   ratio   ratio   ratio  
Macro-economic and financial 
conditions 
            
Dummy prior default -0.5951 0.551 0.376 0.4345 1.544 0.260 -1.1453 0.318 0.201 0.6669 1.948 0.139 
Dummy debt crisis 0.9818*** 2.669 0.000 -0.0896 0.914 0.761 1.0781*** 2.939 0.000 0.0506 1.052 0.845 
Dummy OECD member -0.0918 0.912 0.746 -0.2627 0.769 0.317 -0.3038 0.738 0.353 -0.2271 0.797 0.343 
Change in GDP per capita  -4.7255 0.009 0.194 2.1114 8.259 0.574 -5.9056 0.003 0.088 2.8015 16.469 0.419 
Change in real GDP growth rate  -0.0351 0.966 0.451 -0.0556** 0.946 0.017 -0.0239 0.976 0.594 -0.0544** 0.947 0.022 
Change in inflation  0.0031 1.003 0.482 0.0002 1 0.391 0.0064 1.006 0.206 0.0003 1.000 0.376 
Change in current account to GDP -0.0865*** 0.917 0.001 0.0332 1.034 0.239 -0.0981*** 0.907 0.000 0.0339 1.035 0.163 
Political rights and civil liberties 
            
Dummy freedom 0.0784 1.082 0.788 -0.1476 0.863 0.518 0.05109 1.052 0.854 -0.0141 0.986 0.948 
Likelihood ratio adding culture 18.92***  0.002 33.89***  0.000 27.72***  0.000 17.286***  0.004 
 
This table presents the results from estimating a stratified Cox model for rating changes by S&P, with separate models for upgrades and 
downgrades. The S&P’s sample used to estimate the stratified Cox hazard model includes 382 ratings of which 149 are downgrades and 165 are 
upgrades. Descriptions of the independent variables are given in Table 2 Panel B. The independent variables for culture are coded as numeric 
scores and dummy variables. Dummy variables take a value of one if the culture score is greater than or equal to the mean and zero otherwise. 
Significant coefficients are shown in bold, with ***, ** and * representing significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively using the 
Wald test. The percentage change in the hazard for a one-unit change in an independent variable can be obtained by subtracting one from the 
hazard ratio. The likelihood ratio chi square is based on a comparison of models with culture variables added versus a model containing all the 
variables except the culture variables.  
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Table 6 Cox model for Moody’s rating changes  
 
 Moody’s sample: Numeric Culture Score Moody’s sample: Culture Dummy 
 Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade 
 Coefficient Hazard  Prob. Coefficient  Hazard  Prob. Coefficient  Hazard  Prob. Coefficient Hazard  Prob. 
Variables  ratio   ratio   ratio   ratio  
National culture dimensions             
Power distance index  -0.0007 0.999 0.906 0.01939*** 1.02 0.005       
Individualism  -0.0122 0.988 0.106 -0.0013 0.999 0.843       
Masculinity  -0.003 0.997 0.561 -0.0049 0.995 0.457       
Uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) 0.00671 1.007 0.168 0.00834 1.008 0.183       
Long-term orientation -0.0201*** 0.98 0.000 0.00263 1.003 0.582       
Dummy large power distance index       -0.5355** 0.585 0.016 0.30334 1.354 0.187 
Dummy individualism       -1.1824*** 0.307 0.000 -0.4298 0.651 0.116 
Dummy masculine       0.2083 1.232 0.339 -0.1456 0.865 0.517 
Dummy strong UAI       0.27344 1.314 0.228 0.19773 1.219 0.367 
Dummy long-term orientation       -0.4407* 0.644 0.059 -0.1564 0.855 0.399 
S&P’s rating              
Current rating grade -0.0082 0.992 0.858 -0.1249*** 0.883 0.000 0.0024 1.002 0.959 -0.1050*** 0.900 0.000 
Dummy lag one downgrade 1.2576** 3.517 0.002 -0.3458 0.708 0.301 1.39643*** 4.041 0.001 -0.3096 0.734 0.340 
Lag one rating duration -0.0205 0.98 0.609 -0.0275 0.973 0.575 -0.0415 0.959 0.295 -0.0263 0.974 0.609 
Age since first rated (time-varying) -0.0078 0.992 0.733 0.0508 1.052 0.116 0.00753 1.008 0.745 0.02114 1.021 0.524 
Dummy prior fallen angel  -1.061*** 0.346 0.0049 -0.2312 0.794 0.475 -0.9733** 0.378 0.024 -0.3553 0.701 0.236 
Dummy negative outlook (time-varying) 1.5515*** 4.718 0.000 -15.067*** 0.000 0.000 1.62816*** 5.095 0.000 -15.043*** 0.000 0.000 
Dummy positive outlook (time-varying) -15.901*** 0.000 0.000 1.7028*** 5.489 0.000 -15.927*** 0.000 0.000 1.70981*** 5.528 0.000 
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 Moody’s sample: Numeric Culture Score Moody’s sample: Culture dummy 
 Downgrade Upgrade Downgrade Upgrade 
 Coefficient Hazard  Prob. Coefficient  Hazard  Prob. Coefficient  Hazard  Prob. Coefficient Hazard  Prob. 
Variables  ratio   ratio   ratio   ratio  
Macro-economic and financial 
conditions 
            
Dummy prior default -0.8254 0.438 0.207 0.46537 1.593 0.410 -0.9561 0.384 0.157 0.56306 1.756 0.2795 
Dummy debt crisis 0.2998 1.35 0.397 -0.2899 0.748 0.336 0.22457 1.252 0.478 -0.095 0.909 0.7755 
Dummy OECD member 0.78377*** 2.19 0.001 -0.0326 0.968 0.912 0.5517** 1.736 0.025 0.05959 1.061 0.8161 
Change in GDP per capita  -4.3332 0.013 0.445 -0.3656 0.694 0.893 -5.0758 0.006 0.294 0.01124 1.011 0.9966 
Change in real GDP growth rate  -0.0677 0.935 0.119 -0.0021 0.998 0.924 -0.0688 0.934 0.100 -0.0061 0.994 0.7638 
Change in inflation  -0.0017*** 0.998 0.000 -0.0004 1.000 0.628 -0.0019*** 0.998 0.000 -0.0006 0.999 0.5668 
Change in current account to GDP -0.0591 0.943 0.103 0.0342* 1.035 0.099 -0.0694 0.933 0.055 0.02708 1.027 0.1705 
Political rights and civil liberties              
Dummy freedom 0.1273 1.136 0.6417 -0.2103 0.810 0.399 0.2327 1.262 0.396 -0.1472 0.863 0.6007 
Likelihood ratio adding culture 30.33***  0.000 17.768***  0.003 30.742***  0.000 14.78**  0.0113 
 
This table presents the results from estimating a stratified Cox model for rating changes by Moody’s, with separate models for upgrades and 
downgrades. The Moody’s sample used to estimate the stratified Cox hazard model includes 303 ratings of which 106 are downgrades and 135 
are upgrades. Descriptions of the independent variables are given in Table 2 Panel B. The independent variables for culture are coded as numeric 
scores and dummy variables. Dummy variables take a value of one if the culture score is greater than or equal to the mean and zero otherwise.  
Significant coefficients are shown in bold, with ***, ** and * representing significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively using the 
Wald test. The percentage change in the hazard for a one-unit change in an independent variable can be obtained by subtracting one from the 
hazard ratio. The likelihood ratio chi-square is based on a comparison of models with culture variables added versus a model containing all the 
variables except the culture variables. 
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Table 7 Two-stage residual inclusion analysis  
                                  Two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) Endogeneity-uncorrected 
  First-stage regressions Second-stage ordered probit ordered probit 
           Dependent variable Robust standard errors (SEs) clustered at country Bootstrap SEs, 929 iterations Robust SEs clustered at country 
        (2) PDI (3) IDV (4) MAS (5) UAI (6) LTO (7) Ratings (Coefficient, SE) (8) Ratings (Coefficient, SE) 
Instrumental variables (IVs)           
Tu-vos differentiation (tv_diff) 9.5465** -14.7516***  -11.1777***  5.4095 14.6752*** NA NA 
Historical diseases  2.9975 -12.3017*** 0.4557 -2.3739 -3.3019 NA NA 
Gender inequality 1.6414 -8.8593 26.6359 20.4716 -62.1569*** NA NA 
Catholic minus Protestant (religion)  0.0936*** -0.0358  0.1485*** 0.1755*** -0.045 NA NA 
Logarithm of pre-1500 max calories 
(historical crop yield) -0.1439*** 0.0368  -0.0197  -0.1778***    0.0823** NA NA 
Power distance index (PDI)  NA NA NA NA NA .1137*** (.0284) 0.0101* (.00597) 
Individualism (IDV)  NA NA NA NA NA .0462*** (.0085 ) 0.0101* (.0056) 
Masculinity (MAS)  NA NA NA NA NA .0578*** (.0107) -0.0123*** (.0047) 
Uncertainty avoidance (UAI)   NA NA NA NA NA -.0924*** (.0208 ) -0.009* (.00485) 
Long-term orientation (LTO)  NA NA NA NA NA .04476*** (.004) 0.0099*** (.0035) 
Fitted residual_PDI  NA NA NA NA NA -0.1506*** (.0285) NA 
Fitted residual_IDV  NA NA NA NA NA -0.0509***  (.0084) NA 
Fitted residual_MAS  NA NA NA NA NA -0.0738***   (.0110) NA 
Fitted residual_UAI NA NA NA NA NA 0.108***   (.0208) NA 
Fitted residual_LTO NA NA NA NA NA -0.0375*** (.0041) NA 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1764 1764 1764 1764 1764 1764 1764 
R2 models with IVs 58.6%  67.8%  29.2% 40.8%  37.9%  Pseudo R2: 29.15% Pseudo R2 : 28.02% 
R2 models without IVs 48.7%  53%  7.3%  23%  12.7%  Wald χ2: 1312.67*** Wald χ2: 246.13*** 
F(5,76) statistics 10.46*** 6.85*** 7.11*** 8.14*** 10.92*** Log-likelihood: -3411.55 Log-likelihood: -3466.14 
 
This table reports the results of the 2SRI procedure for S&P rating levels of 77 countries in the sample. Columns (2)-(6) include the results of the first-stage regressions. 
The probabilities of higher rating levels according to culture are modelled in columns (7) and (8). These ordered probit models were estimated using maximum 
likelihood. Column (7) includes the result (coefficient, standard error) of the second stage ordered probit. Fitted residual_PDI is the residual generated from the first-
stage OLS regression where PDI is the dependent variable, and so on. Column (8) includes the results (coefficient, standard error) of the endogeneity-uncorrected 
ordered probit, and the coefficients exactly match those as taken from Table 4 (column 2). Coefficient estimates are given first followed by the corresponding p-values 
(*** p-value ≤ 1%, ** 1%< p-value ≤ 5%, * 5%< p-value ≤ 10%). 
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Figure 1 Distribution of ratings for downgrades and upgrades [ 
 
This figure shows the distribution of S&P’s and Moody’s ratings for upgrades and 
downgrades by the duration (survival time) of the ratings. The histogram bars represent the 
percentage of total observations contained within each class of rating duration. Duration is the 
spell of time a country stays in a rating grade measured from the time a rating is assigned to a 
country until the time the rating is changed by one notch or is censored. A country often 
contribute multiple rating changes to the study. The S&P’s (Moody’s) sample model includes 
382 (303) ratings of which 149 (106) are downgrades and 165 (135) are upgrades. 
  
